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1.  Introduction 
 
Little more than a decade ago, Japanese automakers were on top of the world: In the 1970s, they 
had successfully pioneered the “lean production system” and were expanding their exports rapidly. 
During the 1980s, their competitiveness was rivalled by no-one, and they were aggressively 
promoting overseas production.
1,2 However, since the beginning of the last decade, they had to 
contend with falling production levels and profit rates. As shown in Figure 1, the unit of four-wheel 
vehicles produced domestically has decreased steadily over recent years, reflecting the prolonged 
recession at home as well as the shift toward overseas production. As further indications of the 
malaise, the capital utilization index has also been declining, while the profit rate of the Japanese 
automobile industry has deteriorated, particularly during the early 1990s (Figure 2). These 
developments raise the important question whether the recent stagnation in the Japanese automobile 
industry represents simply a temporary phenomenon caused by the collapse of the Bubble economy 
and the decrease in domestic capital utilization or whether it is a more structural phenomenon 
indicating a decline in productivity growth. 
In this paper, taking the above issues into account, we analyze the productivity change and its 
                                                  
1 The “Lean Production System” of the Japanese automakers is analyzed in detail in Womack et al. (1990). 
Fuss and Waverman (1992) estimate and compare the productivity of the automobile industry in Japan, the 
United States, Canada, and Germany. According to their estimate, the annual growth rate of Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) in the Japanese automobile industry in the 1970s was about 3.9 percent, which was 
approximately three times the rate of other countries. Approaching the topic from a management 
perspective, Itami (1994) also provides a detailed analysis of the performance of the Japanese automobile 
industry up to the early 1990s. 
2  For foreign direct investment and economic performances of foreign affiliates of the Japanese 
automobile firms, see Okamoto (1999), Cusumano and Takeishi (1991), etc.. Moreover, Okamoto (2001), 
which is based on our joint project at RIETI, also undertakes empirical analyses from this viewpoint.   2
determinants in the Japanese automobile industry from 1981 to 1996 based on the plant-level data 
provided in the Industrial Statistics Survey conducted by the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry 
(METI; formerly the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, MITI). Hotly debated issues 
regarding the Japanese automobile industry have been the efficient production system and keiretsu 
transaction relationships. However, the arguments in most earlier studies have been based on 
descriptive analyses or case studies. The main contribution of this paper is to conduct a quantitative 
analysis of the effects that technology spillover through keiretsu transactions and agglomeration has 
on productivity growth, using plant-level Total Factor Productivity (TFP). In order to do so, we focus 
on the following three aspects. 
Firstly, one of the most interesting phenomena regarding recent developments in the Japanese 
automobile industry is the fact that some automakers experienced a significant deterioration in their 
market share and profits, while others achieved remarkable growth and kept or expanded their market 
shares. In other words, a polarization into a lagging and a leading group can be observed. For example, 
Nissan has seen its market share and production shrink and was forced to close factories; a substantial 
share of Mazda’s stocks was acquired by the Ford Motor Company; Honda has expanded its market 
share at the expense of Nissan and Mazda; Toyota remained one of the top players worldwide. This 
paper divides the automakers into two groups – the “better-performing” and the “worse-performing” 
and investigates whether substantial differences in their productivity levels, price-cost margins, 
average inventory ratios, etc. can be found. It should be noted that because we base our analysis on the 
Industrial Statistics Survey data, we are able to concentrate only on plant-level productivity analyses, 
though the performance of automakers depends not only on efficiencies in production and 
procurement but also on product planning and sales promotions.  
[INSERT Figures1 and 2] 
Secondly, it has often been pointed out that in the Japanese machinery industries, including the 
automobile industry, an assembler and its parts suppliers maintain close relationships involving 
recurrent transactions, and that the assembler and the suppliers jointly develop new products and   3
accumulate transaction-specific skills or facilities (Asanuma 1989). Particularly in the automobile 
industry, it is considered that there exits a strong correlation between the productivity of the 
automaker and that of the parts suppliers for the following reasons: 1) suppliers are often located near 
the assembly factory due to the high transportation costs of large auto parts; and 2) the outsourcing 
ratio of Japanese automakers is as high as 70 percent.
 3 Therefore, we compare the productivity 
growth and other performance indices of primary suppliers in the better-performing keiretsu groups 
with those in the worse-performing keiretsu groups. Furthermore, we compare the performances of 
primary suppliers belonging to any keiretsu with those of independent primary suppliers, since some 
previous studies such as Nobeoka (1998) emphasize that independent suppliers who have transaction 
relationships with many automakers are advantageous to keiretsu suppliers in economies of customer 
scope. 
Thirdly, we conduct a regression analysis on the determinants of primary suppliers’ 
productivity growth. We investigate: 1) whether the accumulation of technological knowledge by an 
automaker has spillover effects on its primary suppliers’ productivity growth, and 2) whether the 
geographical distance between the assembly plant and the primary supplier’s plant is relevant to the 
supplier’s productivity growth. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we explain our data as 
well as our method of TFP calculation and discuss the trend over time of TFP in the Japanese 
automobile manufacturing, auto body manufacturing, and auto parts manufacturing industries. In 
Section 3, we analyze the productivity gap between the better-performing automakers and the 
worse-performing automakers. In addition, we compare the performances of the three groups of 
primary suppliers: Suppliers belonging to the better-performing keiretsu groups, suppliers belonging 
to the worse-performing keiretsu groups, and independent suppliers. In Section 4, we carry out an 
                                                  
3 The definition of outsourcing ratio in Yuka Shoken Hokokusho Soran (Directory of Financial Report of 
Listed Companies) is the ratio of the value of parts and processing services purchased from outside firms 
to an automaker’s total manufacturing cost of producing one vehicle unit.   4
econometric investigation of the determinants of the TFP growth rate for primary suppliers, focusing 
on technology spillovers and agglomeration effects. Section 5, finally, offers our conclusion. The 
Appendix presents the methodology of our calculations of various productivity indices, a description 
of the variables used in the econometric analysis, and the capital utilization adjustment for each plant. 
 
 
2.  Productivity in the Japanese Automobile Industry: 1981-1996 
 
As suggested in the previous section, the Japanese automobile industry has generally stagnated 
for most of the past two decades in terms of its production and profitability, particularly in the 1990s. 
In order to judge whether the recent stagnation is a temporary phenomenon caused by the collapse of 
the Bubble Economy or whether it is more a structural phenomenon such as a decline in productivity 
growth, we investigate the capacity-utilization-adjusted TFP and other productivity indices such as 
the value-added per worker, the average inventory ratio, and the capital utilization ratio. 
 
2.1 Properties of Our Data 
We compiled a plant-level panel data set using the micro-data of the Industrial Statistics 
Survey conducted by METI from 1981 to 1996.
4 The original data cover almost all establishments 
with thirty or more employees; they are grouped in the following three industrial classifications: 
Motor vehicles, including motorcycles (industry code: 3111), motor vehicle bodies and trailers (3112), 
and motor vehicle parts and accessories (3113).
5  
                                                  
4 In the Industrial Statistics Survey, the establishment code is re-numbered once every few years, and 
therefore we need the code number converter in order to compile a panel data set for a long period. 
However, as the converter was not available for 1980 and before, we limited our analyses to the period 
from 1981 to 1996.   
5 In the compilation of the panel data for our analysis, we excluded the data for establishments which   5
Compared aggregate data such as those of the Census of Manufactures, micro-data has the 
following advantages for analyzing productivity growth: 1) It can correct the problem arising from 
aggregate data that the covered establishments are not identical throughout the period due to the 
variation of the response ratio or industry classification; 2) it allows an analysis of how the change in 
output share or productivity of each establishment affects the productivity change in the whole 
industry; 3) it also permits a detailed analysis of the effects of factors such as keiretsu relationships or 
the research and development (R&D) activities of each enterprise or establishment. On the other hand, 
there are some drawbacks. For example: 1) panel data cannot include some samples of which data are 
not available continuously due to non-response or a change in industry classification, 2) output or 
intermediate input price-deflators and other data are not available at the establishment-level and, 
therefore, we need some strong assumptions that the same price or other economic indices are 
applicable to all the establishments. The coverage of the panel data used in this study is summarized 
in Appendix Table 1. In the automobile manufacturing industry, the coverage is nearly 100 percent, 
while in the auto parts manufacturing industry it is rather low at about 70 percent. The low coverage 
in the auto parts manufacturing industry might be explained by the following reasons: 1) most of 
establishments in this industry are relatively small and the response ratio tends to be low for small 
scale establishments; 2) since the scale of small establishments often varies around the cut-off point 
of 30 employees, they may be included in one year but not in the next; 3) establishments often change 
                                                                                                                                                        
changed their main product line and their industrial classification during the period from 1981 to 1996. 
Moreover, we dropped data for those establishments for which at least one data item was missing or data 
were not available continuously. In addition, we should note that some of the parts suppliers that produce 
electrical auto parts are classified in the electrical parts and accessories industry rather than the motor 
vehicle parts industry and are not covered by this study. As a result, the data used in this paper only include 
those establishments which have been operating continuously over the period from 1981 to 1996, or which 
were either established or closed during the period but for which data were otherwise available throughout. 
For the new establishments, we dropped the data of the initial year in order to enhance the data credibility.   6
their industrial classification, as a result of a change in product composition and their line of business. 
 
2.2 Measurement of the Plant TFP and the Industry TFP Levels 
Using the establishment-level data of the Industrial Statistics Survey conducted by METI, we 
constructed an annual index of plant-level TFP for each plant from 1981 to 1996. A multilateral index 
which was developed by Caves et al. (1982) is useful for measuring the inputs, outputs, and TFP in 
plant-level data. The multilateral index relies on a single reference point that is constructed as a 
hypothetical plant with input revenue shares that equal the arithmetic mean revenue over all 
observations and input levels that equal the arithmetic mean of the log of the inputs over all 
observations. Each plant’s TFP in each year is measured relative to this hypothetical plant and the 
multilateral index provides transitive comparisons between any subset of the observations. Good et al. 
(1997) extended this approach and modified it to make it applicable to panel data. They constructed a 
hypothetical plant for each cross-section and then the hypothetical plants together over time. This 
productivity index is particularly useful because it provides a consistent way of summarizing the 
cross-sectional distribution of plant TFP and how the distribution moves over time. Aw et al. (1997) 
also used this index to measure firm-level productivity for the Taiwanese manufacturing industry. The 
TFP measure relative to the hypothetical plant in the base time period can be constructed as in 
Equation (1): 
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where plant f’s output in year t is Yft, and a vector of i-th factor input is Xift (i=1,2,…,n). The input 
weights Sift are the share of plant f’s expenditure share of i-th factor input. The overbars denote the 
average value over all plants in year t.
6 
                                                  
6 As shown in Figure 2 in the previous section, the capacity utilization ratio tends to decline throughout the   7
The industry TFP level is defined as a weighted average of each plant’s TFP level and is 
calculated using Equation (2): 
ft
f
ft t TFP TFP ln ln ∑ = θ               (2) 
where  ft θ  denotes the output share of plant f in year t. 
 
The estimated TFP level by industry is as shown in Figure 3. The trend of the TFP level presents a 
movement that more or less parallels the business cycles.
7 TFP is low around 1986, a year when the 
industry was experiencing a recession due to yen appreciation, but improves afterwards. TFP hits its 
peak around the year 1990, then declines, but again picks up after 1994. In the automobile 
manufacturing industry, the TFP level in 1996 is about 0.1, which means that the TFP increased only 
about 10 percent during the 16-year-period studied. Even in the auto parts manufacturing industry 
which shows the highest TFP growth, the average annual TFP growth rate is only approximately 1.3 
percent. Taking into account that in previous studies estimates for the average annual TFP growth rate 
                                                                                                                                                        
period. When we calculate TFP without any adjustment for capacity utilization adjustment, the TFP is 
underestimated in the period with low capacity utilization, while it is overestimated in the period with high 
capacity utilization. Therefore, we first estimate the level of capacity utilization of capital and facilities for 
each plant, then we calculate the capacity-utilization-adjusted TFP. The methodologies to estimate capital 
stock and capital cost for each establishment are described in Appendix 1. For the capital utilization 
adjustment, see Appendix 2. 
7  Basu (1996) as well as Burnside et al. (1995) demonstrate that the positive correlation between 
productivity and business cycles becomes insignificant after the variation of capacity utilization is 
adjusted for. In Figure 3, some positive correlation between the two still remains. This might be because 
we could adjust the capacity utilization for facilities but not for labor. As data on working hours for each 
plant are not available, the working hours are assumed to be same for all the plants in this study. In future 
studies, we would like to consider capacity utilization adjustment for labor in some way.   8
before the 1980s ranged from 3.9 to 4.7 percent, our estimate of a 1.3 percent growth rate for the 
period after 1981 is remarkably low.
8 
 
[INSERT Figure 3] 
 
3. Plant-Level Productivity of the Automakers and Primary Auto Parts Suppliers  
 
3.1 The Productivity Gap between Better-Performing Automakers and Worse-Performing 
Automakers 
Our estimates show that in the automobile manufacturing industry the average annual TFP growth 
rate was only about 0.6 percent from 1981 to 1996. In the following sections, we will examine 
economic performance of each plant owned by the automakers and primary auto parts suppliers 
during this period of minimal growth. In order to investigate the determinants of productivity growth, 
we first analyze the productivity gap between the better-performing automakers and the 
worse-performing automakers. 
We will label as “Group A” three Japanese automakers which increased their industry shares in 
terms of the total units produced and the sales amount during the period from 1981 to 1996. Then, we 
compare the performance of the assembly plants owned by “Group A” automakers with that of the 
other automakers’ plants (“Others”). We calculate the average value of various productivity indices 
for each group, and conduct t-tests in order to investigate whether or not there is a significant 
difference in productivity between the two groups. Table 1 presents the results. The Table shows that 
most of the productivity indices for Group A are substantially superior to those for “Others” in every 
                                                  
8 Fuss and Waverman (1992) estimate that the average annual TFP growth rate in the Japanese automobile 
industry in the 1970s was about 3.9 percent. In contrast, Yoshioka (1989) estimated that the average annual 
TFP growth rate in the Japanese transport equipment industry from 1964 to 1982 was about 4.7 percent.   9
period. For most of the productivity indices, the difference in the average values between the two 
groups is statistically significant. However, the difference in average monthly wages between the two 
groups is not significant in the periods from 1981 to 1986 and from 1986 to 1991, while the difference 
is significant in the period from 1991 to 1996. This may imply that the group of other companies 
lowered wages as part of restructuring efforts during the 1990s. Moreover, the gap in the average 
price-cost margin between the two groups is getting larger over time. As for the TFP, Group A shows 
a significantly higher TFP level than Others in every period. Therefore, from Table 1, we clearly find 
that the better-performing automakers (Group A) were significantly more productive than the other 
automakers (Others) during the period from1981 to 1996. 
[INSERT Table 1] 
 
3.2 Transaction Relationships between Automobile Manufacturers and Auto Parts Suppliers  
In the previous sub-section, we found that the assembly plants of better-performing automakers 
(Group A) showed a significantly higher productivity than those of the other automakers. This should 
be a result of the productivity improvements by automakers themselves. However, we consider that 
the productivity of automakers to a considerable extent also depends on the productivity of the auto 
parts suppliers particularly in the Japanese automobile industry, where at about 70 percent the 
outsourcing ratio is fairly high. Therefore, we now focus on the performances of the auto parts 
suppliers. In fact, a persistent argument in many previous studies has been that the high performance 
of the parts suppliers and the efficient organization of the supplier system have been a crucial source 
of competitiveness in the Japanese automobile industry.
9  Highlighted in particular as important 
characteristics of the Japanese supplier system have been relationships based on long-term recurrent 
transactions as well as the high technical capabilities of parts suppliers (Asanuma 1984; Cusumano 
                                                  
9 There are many previous studies on the Japanese automobile supplier system. For example, see Fujimoto 
(1995).   10
and Takeishi 1991). A noted difference with auto parts suppliers in the United States or in Europe in 
the 1980s was that most of the primary auto parts suppliers in Japan had their own product 
development capabilities (Clark and Fujimoto 1991). A distinguishing feature of the longstanding 
transaction relations as pointed out by Asanuma (1989), therefore has been that the Japanese 
automakers and auto parts suppliers engage in joint product development efforts and benefit from 
accumulated “relation-specific skills.”
10  The Japanese automakers provide careful guidance and 
technical assistance to auto parts suppliers both at the stages of product development and production. 
Moreover, the Japanese automakers and their suppliers engage in frequent face-to-face contacts and 
information sharing. According to case studies carried out in Japan and the United States, in Japan 
auto parts suppliers tend to be located nearer to their automaker’s assembly plant and spend more 
hours in face-to-face contacts with their customers (Dyer 1996).
11 It has been reported  that these 
features are most distinct in the Toyota Group and that Toyota has a superior ability to effectively 
create and manage knowledge-sharing network (Dyer and Nobeoka 2000). 
On the other hand, Nobeoka (1998) shows that independent suppliers, who have transaction 
relations with several automakers and do not concentrate on transactions with one particular 
automaker, tend to have a higher profitability. According to Nobeoka, the wider range of customers 
means that by constructing cooperative relationships with more automakers, the suppliers can benefit 
                                                  
10 According to Asanuma (1989), some surplus value-added is generated by the “relation-specific skills”, 
and this surplus value-added corresponds to the relational quasi-rent introduced by Aoki (1988). 
11 Dyer (1996), based on the results of his survey on the U.S. “Big Three” as well as Toyota and Nissan, 
found that the difference in the assembler-supplier relationships between Japan and the United States is 
statistically significant. Toyota’s supplier plants are located at an average distance of 59.2 miles from 
Toyota’s assembly plants, while Nissan’s suppliers were an average distance of 113.9 miles away. In 
contrast, “Big Three” supplier plants were on average roughly 500 miles from the automakers’ plants. 
Moreover, Toyota’s suppliers had an average number of 6.8 guest engineers compared with 1.8 for Nissan 
and less than one for each of the U.S. “Big Three.”   11
from greater learning opportunities. That is, suppliers, who have their own product development 
capabilities and organizational management skills and who are able to propose an effective use of 
common parts to several different automakers, enjoy a greater competitiveness.
12 
The findings of the previous studies mentioned suggest that there is a strong correlation between 
the productivity of automakers and that of auto parts suppliers. Therefore, in the succeeding 
sub-section, we compare productivity levels between keiretsu  suppliers of Group A (the three 
better-performing automakers) and the keiretsu suppliers of other automakers. In addition, we 
compare productivity levels between suppliers belonging to any keiretsu and independent suppliers.
13 
 
3.3  Comparison between Keiretsu Suppliers and Independent Suppliers 
   Based on the information provided in Auto Trade Journal (1997), we classify suppliers into keiretsu 
suppliers of Group A, keiretsu suppliers of other automakers, and independent suppliers.
14 In the 
same way as in Section 3.1, we conduct statistical examinations on the average productivity of the 
                                                  
12 When a supplier participates in the product development process for several automakers, knowledge 
diffusion among automakers should be promoted. At the same time, however, it is accompanied by some 
risks such as free-riding. For rules or incentive problems to overcome such risks, more research into both 
the theoretical and the empirical aspects would be desirable. 
13 The comparison of the productivity of auto parts suppliers is limited to primary parts suppliers because 
of the availability of firm information. 
14 We identified the keiretsu relationships using the information on capital and transaction relationships 
recorded in Auto Trade Journal (1997). Our definition of keiretsu suppliers is that 1) 20 percent or more 
paid-in capital are owned by an automaker, or 2) an automaker’s capital participation rate is less than 20 
percent, but more than 30 percent of the output of the supplier is sold to the automaker. Our definition of 
independent suppliers is that an automaker’s capital participation rate is less than 20 percent, and the 
output of the supplier is sold to several automakers.   12
auto parts suppliers. Table 2 shows the comparison of productivity measures between Group A 
keiretsu suppliers and other keiretsu suppliers, while Table 3 shows the comparison between keiretsu 
suppliers and independent suppliers. Although we found strongly significant productivity 
differentials between Group A automakers and other automakers in the analysis in Table 1, we cannot 
find such significant differences in the performance between Group A keiretsu suppliers and other 
keiretsu suppliers. However, we should note that Group A keiretsu suppliers show a significantly 
higher TFP growth rate from 1981 to 1996. 
   However, as Table 3 indicates, independent suppliers generally show a higher performance than 
keiretsu suppliers, and particularly in 1991, the difference in performance is statistically significant. 
This seems to support Nobeoka’s findings that independent suppliers are more profitable (Nobeoka 
1998). 
      Each auto parts supplier, however, makes various kinds of products and the strength of the 
relationships with an automaker varies among suppliers. This means that we should not rely only on a 
statistical test on the mean. In the next section, we conduct a regression analysis on the determinants 
of auto parts suppliers’ TFP growth.  
[INSERT Tables 2 and 3] 
 
4.  Econometric Analysis on Determinants of Auto Parts Suppliers’ TFP Growth 
 
4.1 The Model 
   As mentioned above, Asanuma (1989), Aoki (1988), and others argue that there exist long-term 
recurrent transaction relationships between an automaker and its keiretsu suppliers, and that primary 
keiretsu suppliers possess accumulated “relation-specific skills” as a result of joining the automaker’s   13
product development from an early stage. Following from this argument, we posit the hypothesis that 
suppliers which are located near the automaker and utilize technological knowledge jointly with the 
automaker will achieve higher productivity growth (Hypothesis I). 
   Nobeoka (1996, 1998), in contrast, insists that an automaker and its keiretsu suppliers should create 
an open transaction network and utilize economies of customer scope.  According to his argument, 
profitable automakers tend to purchase one kind of part from more than one supplier and do not 
concentrate on transactions with a specific supplier. Nobeoka’s empirical analysis also shows that 
more profitable auto parts suppliers enjoy economies of scope by expanding their transaction 
relationships to several automakers. Therefore, it is hypothesized that suppliers who have a larger 
number of transaction relationships and do not concentrate on a relationship with a specific 
automaker will achieve higher productivity growth (Hypothesis II). 
   In order to test the two hypotheses above, we estimate the following regression model which 
explains the determinants of auto parts suppliers’ TFP growth. 
f f f f f f f W D Y TFP TFP TFP ε δ φ γ β α + + + + + = − − − − 1 , 1 , 1 , ln ln ln ln             (3) 
   The left-hand side of Equation (4) represents the TFP growth rate of plant f. On the right-hand side, 
α  is the constant term and  1 , ln − f TFP  is the logarithm of the initial TFP level of plant f. As Dowrick 
and Nguyen (1989) discuss, a plant with a low initial TFP level may achieve higher TFP growth 
because of the catch-up effect. Taking this effect into account, we add the initial TFP level as an 
explanatory variable.
15 
                                                  
15 When a temporary shock affects TFP, the coefficient of the initial TFP level may possibly take a 
negative value even though there are no catch-up effects. This is known as “Galton’s fallacy”. For a 
discussion of economic convergence and “Galton’s fallacy”, see, for example, Friedman (1992) and Quah 
(1993).   14
   The third term of the right hand side ( ) 1 , ln − f Y  is the logarithm of the initial output of plant f and this 
controls the scale effect. Df is a dummy variable for plant f’s products. Wf is a vector of plant f’s 
various characteristics, and  f ε  is the error term. We take each plant’s TFP growth rate from 1981 to 
1996 as the dependent variable and the year 1981 is the initial year of our analysis. Samples used in 
our regression analysis are plants of primary auto parts suppliers for which firm information and data 
on the sales ratio to each automaker are available in Auto Trade Journal (1997).  
      In order to examine the above two hypotheses, we consider the following factors as the 
determinants of auto parts suppliers’ TFP growth: 
(i)   Keiretsu: A keiretsu supplier of a specific automaker, or an independent supplier and the strength 
of the keiretsu relationships. We use dummy variables to control for the keiretsu factor. 
(ii)  Range of Customers: Economies of scope generated by expanding the range of customers and 
by not being concentrated on a specific transaction with a specific automaker. As a variable 
representing the customer concentration ratio, we use a Herfindahl index which is constructed 
from the sales ratio to each automaker. In addition, as a variable representing diversified 
business, we use a non-automobile customer ratio (1- sum of shares of sales to automakers). 
According to Hypothesis II, we would expect a negative coefficient for the former variable and 
a positive coefficient for the latter. 
(iii)  R&D Spillovers from Automakers: R&D spillover effects generated through the transaction 
relationship with an automaker. We use the R&D intensity of automakers and we expect a 
positive coefficient. 
(iv)  Agglomeration Effect: Positive effects generated by being located near the R&D center or the 
assembly plant of an automaker. When the suppliers are located near the automaker, it should 
be easier to promote face-to-face contacts or information exchange among engineers and to 
efficiently carry out the Just-In-Time production system. We use the distance between the   15
supplier’s plant and the R&D center or the assembly plant of the automaker. We would expect a 
negative coefficient. 
 
   We estimate the following six regression models in order to identify the determinants of suppliers’ 
TFP growth.
16 
Model 1: Comparison between Keiretsu Suppliers and Independent Suppliers 
In order to test whether there is a significant difference in TFP growth rates between keiretsu 
suppliers and independent suppliers, we include a dummy variable which takes the value one 
for independent suppliers. 
Model 2: Range of Customers and R&D Spillover Effect from Automakers 
According to Hypothesis I, auto parts suppliers will receive positive R&D spillovers from the 
automakers with whom they have transaction relationships, and therefore the supplier’s TFP 
will be increased by the R&D spillover effect. In contrast, according to Hypothesis II, TFP of 
the suppliers who have a wide range of customers will increase faster as a result of the scope 
economies effect. Therefore, we introduce two variables which represent the automaker’s R&D 
intensity and the range of customers, respectively. As Griliches (1995) argues, R&D spillovers 
are ideas borrowed by research teams of industry (or firm) i from the research results of 
industry (or firm) j.
 17 It is considered that the extent of borrowed knowledge from other 
                                                  
16 For detailed definitions and sources of the variables, see Appendix 1. 
17 Total factor productivity in industry i is affected by productivity improvements in industry j to the extent 
of its purchases from that industry and to the extent that the improvements in j have not been appropriated 
by its producers and/or have not been incorporated in the official price indices of that industry by the 
relevant statistical agencies. This kind of effect, however, is not real knowledge spillover but just a 
consequence of conventional measurement problem.    16
industries or firms depends on the technological “distance.” Although the relevant concept of 
“distance” is very hard to define empirically, we use the purchase share or sales share as a proxy 
for the technological distance. Therefore, in our calculation, automaker’s R&D intensity for a 
supplier is a weighted average of the R&D intensity of all the automakers with whom the 
supplier has a transaction relationship.  
Models 3, 4: Distance between automakers and suppliers 
According to Hypothesis I, when automakers and suppliers are located close to each other, their 
face-to-face contacts will become much easier, generating larger R&D spillover effects. 
Therefore, we include the following two explanatory variables in the model. 
(i)  The automaker’s R&D intensity divided by the distance between the R&D center of the 
automaker and the supplier’s plant. 
(ii)  The average distance between the automaker’s assembly plant and the supplier’s plant. 
Models 5, 6: Automaker-Specific Effects 
Although there should be many factors specific to an automaker, we only control the R&D 
intensity in Models 2, 3, and 4. As a result, the estimated coefficients of other explanatory 
variables may contain some biases. For example, in some keiretsu, when the assembly plant of 
the automaker and its keiretsu suppliers are located closely together and when overall 
performances are not good for some reasons other than R&D, the coefficient of the distance 
variable will be biased in a positive direction. In order to solve this kind of problem, in Models 
5 and 6, we control the automaker-specific effects using keiretsu dummy variables. 
 
4.2 Estimation Results 
Table 4 reports the results of the estimates of Models 1 to 6. Both the coefficients on initial TFP   17
level (lnTFP(-1)) and on initial output (lnY(-1)) were found to be negative and significant. That is, the 
lower the initial TFP level and the smaller the initial output of a plant, the higher is the rate of TFP 
growth achieved. In addition, the estimated coefficient on the independent supplier dummy is not 
significant in Model 1, suggesting that there is no significant difference in TFP growth between 
keiretsu suppliers and independent suppliers. This suggests that we should take account not only of 
the existence of keiretsu relationships but also of the strength of such relationships, which differs for 
the various keiretsu groups. 
Irrespective of the specification, the R&D intensity of automakers (RDINT1, RDINT2) has a 
significantly positive coefficient, suggesting the existence of R&D spillover effects from the 
automakers. We should note that many primary auto parts suppliers also conduct R&D activities by 
themselves and that we should include parts suppliers’ own R&D intensity in the regression models. 
For most auto parts suppliers, however, R&D data are not available and we gave up on including 
suppliers’ R&D intensity in our regression. As for the R&D intensity divided by the distance between 
automakers’ R&D center and the supplier’s plant (RDINT1/DISTRD,  RDINT2/DISTRD), the 
coefficient has a positive sign but was not statistically significant. 
Turning to the distance between assembly plant and supplier plant (lnDIST), the estimated 
coefficient is not significant in Models 3 and 4. However, when we control for the automaker-specific 
factors by including keiretsu dummy variables, the coefficient of the distance is negative and 
significant as reported in Models 5 and 6. Thus, if a supplier’s plant is located far from the assembly 
plant, its TFP growth rate tends to be low, which suggests there is a positive effect from the 
agglomeration of suppliers near the assembly plant. 
The non-automobile customer ratio (NONAUTO), which represents a diversified business or a 
wide range of customers, has a significantly positive coefficient, irrespective of specification. The 
more diversified the supplier is and the more its products are sold to non-automobile customers, the 
higher the TFP growth that was achieved. The estimated coefficient on the customer concentration   18
ratio (HI), however, has a negative sign but was not significant in any of the models. 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
Thus, our estimation results support Hypothesis I, suggesting that the parts suppliers who are 
located near the assembly plant and keep a close relationships with the automaker realize higher TFP 
growth through the joint-use of technological knowledge with the automaker. On the other hand, we 
did not obtain clear evidence which supports Hypothesis II. Both the independent suppliers dummy 
(DINDEP) and the customer concentration ratio do not have significant coefficients. However, we 
obtain a significantly positive coefficient for the non-automobile customer ratio. This suggests that 
suppliers who sell a larger share of their products to non-automobile customers show a higher TFP 
growth rate.  
Now let us examine the reason for performance differentials among keiretsu. Figure 4 shows the 
relationship between an automaker’s R&D intensity and the average distance between the automaker 
and its keiretsu primary suppliers.
18 In Figure 4, we find that the three better-performing automakers 
(Group A) tend to display a higher R&D intensity, while the three worse-performing automakers 
(Group B) tend to have a relatively lower R&D intensity. As for the distance between an automaker’s 
R&D center and its keiretsu suppliers, we cannot see any clear tendency for the above two groups 
(Panel (a) of Figure 5). However, as for the distance between an automaker’s assembly plant and its 
keiretsu suppliers, we can see that the distance tends to be shorter in Group A and to be longer in 
Group B (Panel (b) of Figure 4). Our results in Table 4 and the relationship in Panel (b) of Figure 4 
                                                  
18 Average distance between an automaker and its keiretsu primary suppliers is calculated as follows. The 
automaker i’s purchase from plants j of keiretsu suppliers is zi1, zi2, …, zij. The distance between automaker 
i’s R&D center or assembly plant and plants j of keiretsu suppliers is di1, di2, …, dij. Then, the average 
distance between automaker i and its keiretsu suppliers is calculated using the following equation: 
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imply that geographical proximity is an important factor for productivity growth both at the 
automaker’s plants and its keiretsu suppliers’ plants. If the keiretsu suppliers are located near the 
automaker’s assembly plant, face-to-face contacts among engineers of both the automaker and the 
suppliers can be much more easily arranged, shortening the lead time in product development. 
Moreover, other aspects of the production system, such as Just-in-Time delivery, will be much more 
efficient. As mentioned in Section 3, Dyer (1996) conducts a comparative study on Japanese and U.S. 
automakers and concludes that the important characteristics of Japanese automakers are the 
geographical proximity with parts suppliers and the frequent communication among engineers. The 
results of our analysis imply that the geographical factor is also an important determinant of the 
difference in Japanese automaker’s performance. The better-performing automakers have an 
agglomeration of parts suppliers near the assembly plants and utilize the technological knowledge 
jointly with their suppliers. This may possibly generate synergies leading to productivity growth at 
both the automakers and the suppliers. 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we analyzed productivity growth and its determinants in the Japanese automobile 
industry since the 1980s, focusing on R&D spillover effects and agglomeration effects in transaction 
relationships between automakers and auto parts suppliers. 
   According to our measurement, the annual TFP growth rate from 1981 to 1996 was at low level, i.e., 
about 0.6 percent in the automobile manufacturing industry and about 1.3 percent in the auto parts 
manufacturing industry. Given that the annual TFP growth rate for the Japanese automobile industry 
until the early 1980s was estimated at approximately around 4 percent in previous studies, our 
estimates of 0.6 to1.3 percent are very low.  
   During the period of stagnating productivity since the 1980s, the performance differentials among   20
automakers have magnified. We found differences among automakers in inventory ratios, price-cost 
margins, TFP, and so on. As for the automakers that achieved relatively high TFP growth (we called 
them Group A), their keiretsu suppliers also tend to show a higher TFP growth rate. Moreover, our 
regression results imply that Group A automakers tend to have many keiretsu suppliers near the 
assembly plants and to share technological knowledge with their suppliers, and that, therefore, both 
the automakers and the suppliers could attain higher productivity growth. Although previous case 
studies have often pointed out the importance of “relation-specific skills” and knowledge-sharing 
networks, these had so far not been empirically and statistically investigated using measurements of 
plant productivity. Using plant-level data, our study  for the first time empirically demonstrated 
significant R&D spillover effects and agglomeration effects on parts suppliers’ TFP growth. 
   In our comparison of independent suppliers and keiretsu suppliers, we did not obtain significant 
evidence that the former tend to show higher TFP growth rates than the latter. We found, however, 
that parts suppliers who have a wider range of customers such as non-automakers tend to show higher 
TFP growth. 
   Several points remain to be further investigated. Although we found that geographical proximity 
with automakers had significantly positive effects on parts suppliers’ TFP growth, many other 
locational factors such as the agglomeration of related supporting industries and various types of 
infrastructure probably also affect productivity. In addition, the keiretsu relationships are said to be 
changing along with automakers’ business re-structuring and with the shift toward overseas 
production. It is possible that this would also affect productivity. These points are to be investigated in 
future. 
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APPENDIX 1. Data Sources and Methods of Data Construction  
 
1.1 Measures of Capital Input and Capital Cost 
Using plant-level data on the book value of tangible fixed assets, we constructed an index of 
the real value of net stock of buildings and structures, machinery and equipment, and others
19, for 
each plant. The net capital stock of plant f in the initial year b in constant 1990 yen, RKfb is calculated 
as follows: 
( ) b b fb fb BV HCK BV RK * =                ( A 1 )  
where BVfb is the initial net book value of plant f, HCKb represents the initial net capital stock of the 
whole industry in constant 1990 yen, and BVb is the initial net book value of the whole industry. That 
is, (HCKb/BVb) stands for the ratio of real value in constant 1990 yen to book value of capital stock of 
the whole industry in year b. As an appropriate industry-level capital stock deflator is not available in 
Japan, we constructed this ratio ourselves. HCKb, the initial net capital stock of the whole industry in 
constant 1990 yen, is calculated as follows: 
(i)  We take the data on the book value of tangible fixed assets from the Census of Manufactures 
1970 published by MITI. We converted the book value into the real value in constant 1990 
yen using the net fixed assets deflator in the Annual Report on National Accounts published 
by the Economic Planning Agency. 
(ii)  Using the perpetual inventory method, we added the new investment in constant 1990 yen to 
the real value of 1970 fixed assets and then subtracted the value of depreciation. We repeated 
this calculation for succeeding years. We used the capital formation deflator in the Annual 
Report on National Accounts. 
 
                                                  
19 In the Japanese Industrial Statistics Survey, transportation equipment and tools are classified as other 
tangible fixed assets.   22
Starting from the initial net capital stock of plant f calculated by Equation (A1), the following 
perpetual inventory formula was applied separately for buildings and structures, equipment, 
machinery and equipment, and others: 
() ft ft ft I RK RK + − = − δ 1 * 1                (A2) 
Using results obtained by Dean et al. (1990), the depreciation rates (δ ) for buildings and structures, 
machinery and equipment, and others are assumed to be 0.062, 0.173, and 0.281 respectively. Ift 
represents the value of newly acquired tangible fixed assets, deflated by the capital formation deflator 
in the Annual Report on National Accounts. 
 
   Following Fuss and Waverman (1992) and Tajika and Yui (2000), the rental rate of capital (pk) is 
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where qk is the price of the k-th investment good, τ is the corporate tax rate, z is present value of the 
depreciation allowances on an investment of one unit of currency, r is the ex ante rate of return,  k δ  is 
the rate of depreciation of the k-th investment good, and dqk/qk is the rate of capital gain on that good. 
We used the capital formation deflator in the Annual Report on National Accounts for qk, and the 
average long-term loan contract rate (city banks and regional banks) published by the Bank of Japan 
for r. Data on corporate tax rates were taken from the Ministry of Finance Statistics Monthly. To 
obtain the implicit cost of capital, the real capital stock estimated as above was multiplied by the 
rental rates per yen of capital. 
 
1.2 Costs of other factor inputs 
   For labor costs, we use the “total cash wages and salaries paid” deflated by the general consumer   23
price index (whole country, 1990 base) in the Price Indexes Annual published by the Bank of Japan. 
   The cost of intermediate goods (raw materials) is the “cost of raw materials and subcontracting 
orders” deflated by the overall wholesale price index for intermediate materials (semi-finished goods, 
1990 base) in the Price Indexes Annual published by the Bank of Japan. The cost of intermediate 
goods (fuels and electricity) is the “cost of fuels and electricity consumed” deflated by the overall 
wholesale price index for intermediate materials (fuel & energy, 1990 base) in the Price Indexes 
Annual. For labor input, we use the “total number of workers” multiplied by the hours worked index. 
The hours worked index is calculated using data on the number of monthly hours worked per regular 
employee (total hours worked; motor vehicles, parts, and accessories)” in the Monthly Labour Survey 
published by the Ministry of Labour. 
 
1.3 Productivity Measures 
Output per worker (unit: 10,000 yen per person): 
Output / (“monthly average number of regular employees” + “private entrepreneurs and unpaid 
family workers”) * hours worked index / 100 
Output = “value of shipments” + “value of inventories of finished goods, semi-manufactured 
products, and unfinished products at end of the year” – “value of finished goods, 
semi-manufactured products, and unfinished products at beginning of the year” 
z  Output is deflated by the domestic wholesale price index (automobiles or automobile parts, 
1990 base) in the Price Index Annual. 
Value added per worker (unit: 10,000 yen per person): 
Value added / (“monthly average number of regular employees” + “private entrepreneurs and 
unpaid family workers”) * hours worked index / 100 
Value added = output – (“cost of raw materials, fuels and electricity consumed, and 
subcontracting orders” + “value of depreciation”) 
Average Inventory Ratio:   24
0.5*(“value of inventories at beginning of the year” + “value of inventories at end of the year”) / 
output 
Average monthly wages: 
(‘Total cash wages and salaries paid to regular employee” / 12) / “monthly average number of 
regular employee” * hours worked index / 100 
Capital-labor ratio: 
Real value of net capital stock / (“monthly average number of regular employees” + “private 
entrepreneurs and unpaid family workers”) 
Outsourcing ratio: 
“Cost of raw materials, fuels and electricity consumed, and subcontracting orders” / (“total cash 
wages and salaries paid” + “cost of raw materials, fuels and electricity consumed, and 
subcontracting orders” + implicit total cost of capital) 
Price-cost margin: 
(Output – “cost of raw materials, fuels and electricity consumed, and subcontracting orders”) / 
output 
Output-cost ratio: 
Output / (“total cash wages and salaries paid” + “cost of raw materials, fuels and electricity 
consumed, and subcontracting orders” + implicit total cost of capital) 
 
1.4 Description of Variables Used in the Regression Analysis 
Share of purchases from a supplier’s plant in an automaker’s total value of purchases (P): 
  For each automaker (Toyota, Nissan, Mitsubishi, Mazda, Honda, Isuzu, Suzuki, Daihatsu, Subaru, 
and Hino), we first calculated the value of purchases from each plant of auto parts suppliers using 
our plant-level data and the data in the Auto Trade Journal (1997). Then, for each automaker, we 
divide the value of purchases from the supplier’s plant by the total value of the automaker’s 
purchases.   25
Share of sales to an automaker in a supplier’s total value of sales (S): 
  The data is taken from the Auto Trade Journal (1997). Although most suppliers also sell their 
products to customers other than the ten major Japanese automakers, we calculated the share in 
order that the sum of the shares for the ten major automakers should become unity. 
Non-automobile customers ratio (NONAUTO): 
  We define the non-automobile customer ratio as (1 – sum of shares of sales to the ten major 
Japanese automakers). 
Customer concentration ratio (HI): 
  The Herfindahl index representing the customer concentration ratio is defined as follows: 







ik k S HI                  (A4) 
 where  Sik (i=1,2,…,10) is the share of sales to automaker i in supplier k’s total value of sales. 
Automaker’s R&D intensity (RDINT1, RDINT2): 
  We first calculate the R&D stock for the ten major automakers. Following Griliches (1980), 
Nadiri (1980), and Goto and Suzuki (1989), we calculate the R&D stock using the perpetual 
inventory formula. We employ 10.5 percent as the rate of obsolescence of the R&D stock. In 
order to estimate the rate of obsolescence of R&D stock, we used the Science and Technology 
Agency’s survey of the “life span” of technology (Science and Technology Agency, White Papers 
on Science and Technology 1986). This “life span” is the length of time patents generated royalty 
revenues, and/or the average length of time products embodying the patented technologies 
generated profits. Assuming that R&D stock depreciates and becomes obsolete over time, we 
obtain the rate of obsolescence by simply taking the inverse of the average “life span” of patents 
in automobile industry. 
  Assuming that the growth rate of R&D expenditure, RFit, is the same as the growth rate of R&D 










1            ( A 5 )  
 where  g is the growth rate of RFit and θ  is the rate of obsolescence of R&D stock. In this paper, 
the initial year tb is 1981, and g is the average growth rate from 1982 to 1987. Our R&D 
expenditure data are taken from Kaisha Shiki Ho [Japan Company Handbooks] published by 
Toyo Keizai Shimpo-sha. To obtain the real value of R&D expenditure, we used the R&D 
expenditure deflator (natural science, corporations, 1990 base) in the White Papers on Science 
and Technology 2000.  
  Then, we calculated the R&D intensity by dividing the annual average increase of the 
automaker’s R&D stock by the annual average of its sales. Our sales data are taken from Yuka 
Shoken Hokokusho [Financial Report of Listed Companies].  
  For each auto parts supplier k, the automaker’s R&D intensity (Definition 1) for plant j of supplier 
k, RDINT1kj, is obtained as follows: 
   i
i





1    (i=1,2,…,10)                 (A6) 
 where  Pikj is the share of purchases from plant j of supplier k in automaker i’s total value of 
purchases. Therefore, RDINT1kj is the weighted average of the R&D intensities of all ten 
automakers. 









2                 (i=1,2,…,10)                (A7) 
where Sik is the share of sales to automaker i in supplier k’s total value of sales. We should note 
that Sik is assumed to be same for all the plants owned by supplier k. 
Distance from the automaker’s R&D center (DISTRD): 
The distance between the supplier’s plant and the automaker’s main R&D center is calculated by   27
the spherical distance formula using data on latitude and longitude of the city, town, or village.  
Distance from automaker’s assembly plant (DIST): 
The distance between supplier’s plant and automaker’s assembly plant is calculated by the 
spherical distance formula using data on latitude and longitude of the city, town, or village. 
Although each of the ten major Japanese automakers has more than one assembly plants, we 
calculate the distance from the nearest assembly plant of each automaker. The distance between 
plant j of supplier k and automaker i’s assembly plant, DISTkj is obtained as follows: 
ikj
i
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where  DISTRDikj is the distance between plant j of supplier k and automaker i’s R&D center. 










                (i=1,2,…,10)               (A10) 
Keiretsu dummies: 
We classify primary auto parts suppliers into keiretsu suppliers of the ten major automakers or 
non-keiretsu independent suppliers, using the information in the Auto Trade Journal (1997). We 
employ the following variables representing keiretsu relationships: 
(i)  DMAKER: A dummy which takes one for plants directly owned by the automakers and 
zero for other plants. 
(ii)  Cross term of sales share and keiretsu dummy: 
i i DKRETS S ×                 (i=1,2,…,9) 
where Si is the share of sales to automaker i in a supplier’s total value of sales, and 
DKRETSi is a dummy which takes one for plants belonging to    28
automaker i’s keiretsu. 
(iii)   DINDEP: A dummy which takes one for independent plants that do not belong to any 
keiretsu. 
Product dummies: 
Using the item code of the major product of each plant, we compile the product dummies 




APPENDIX 2. Estimation of Plants’ Capital Utilization Ratio  
 
To estimate the capital utilization ratio, we use data on intermediate inputs or electricity 
consumed which are considered to be correlated with the level of capital utilization.
20 We estimate the 
capital utilization ratio in the following way: 
(i)  First of all, we estimate the following equation which represents capital utilization, using 
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where ut is the capital utilization ratio, Mt is the cost of raw materials, Kt is the real value of 
net capital stock, Pmt is the price of raw materials, and Pkt is the price of capital in year t. For 
ut , we use the capital utilization index (1990 base) for the transportation equipment 
industry as reported by MITI and for Mt, the cost of raw materials for the manufacture of 
motor vehicles and motor vehicle parts (industry code: 311) in the Census of Manufactures 
published by MITI. Kt is the real value of net capital stock calculated in the same way as 
                                                  
20 For example, Jorgenson and Griliches (1995), Burnside et al. (1995), Basu (1996), and Fukao and 
Murakami (2000) estimate capital utilization ratio using data on energy or intermediate inputs consumed.   29
explained in Appendix 1.1, using the data on the book value of tangible fixed assets 
reported in the Census of Manufactures. For Pmt, we use the overall wholesale price index 
for intermediate materials (semi-finished goods, 1990 base) in the Price Indexes Annual 
published by the Bank of Japan. Pkt is the price of capital calculated in the same way as 
explained in Appendix 1.1. Taking the difference of the logarithm of each variable, we 
conducted an ordinary least squares estimation for Equation (A11) using annual data from 
1973 to 1998. The estimated equation is as follows: 
   ( ) t t t K M u ln 370 . 0 006 . 0 ln ∆ + − = ∆           (A12) 
   (-0.624)    (2.607)** 
       No. of observations: 25 
        F-value:  6.8** 
       Adjusted R-squared: 0.195 
Note that the t-values are in parentheses and that two asterisks (**) indicate a significance 
level of 5 percent. 
(ii)  Using the above Equation (A12), the theoretical value of the change in capital utilization 
ratio is calculated for each plant. Then, we obtain the trend of the capital utilization ratio for 
each plant. Assuming that the capital utilization ratio should be 100 percent at the peak of 
the trend, the level of capital utilization at each year can be calculated one after another. 
However, it is not realistic that exiting plants are operating at full capacity, even though the 
trend is at its peak. Therefore, for exiting plants, we assume that the capital utilization ratio 
at the peak of the trend is the average capital utilization ratio of all the plants operating 
throughout. 
(iii)  We multiply the three kinds of capital inputs (buildings and structures, machinery and 
equipment, and others) with the estimated capital utilization ratio for each plant. 
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 Figure 1: Production and Export Units of Four-Wheelers by the Japanese Automakers  











1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
Domestic Production Exports Overseas Production ʢ1,000 unitʣFigure 2: Capital Utilization Ratio and Profit Rates in the Japanese Automobile Industry
Sources: METI (former MITI), Tsusan Handbook (various years) [Handbook of International
Trade and Industry].
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Automobile manufacturing Auto body manufacturing
Auto parts manufacturingTable 1: Differences among Automobile Assembly Plants (Average in Period):  Group A vs. Others 
Group A Others t-test Group A Others t-test Group A Others t-test
No. of plants 72 162 73 165 78 180
Output per worker 8472.28 6068.02 *** 12171.84 8608.62 *** 13850.27 10215.02 ***
Value-added per worker 1857.83 1276.36 *** 2879.09 1678.43 *** 3650.68 1812.39 ***
Average inventory ratio 0.03 0.05 *** 0.03 0.05 ** 0.03 0.06 ***
Average monthly wage 41.12 40.44 46.50 45.12 54.39 49.62 ***
Capital-labor ratio 1492.90 1088.56 *** 1844.25 1399.21 *** 2271.73 1920.55 **
Outsourcing ratio 0.84 0.82 *** 0.88 0.85 *** 0.85 0.83
Price-cost margin 0.16 0.13 * 0.18 0.13 ** 0.23 0.15 ***
Output-cost ratio 1.17 1.11 ** 1.24 1.12 *** 1.31 1.14 ***
Capital utilization ratio (%) 85.92 83.12 88.17 84.06 ** 80.89 78.29
TFP level (in logarithm) 0.02 -0.05 *** 0.06 -0.04 *** 0.10 -0.03 ***
Notes: 1. All figures are the simple mean of the values of all the samples in each period.
2. Group A refers to plants owned by the three Japanese automakers which increased their market shares during the 
   period from 1981 to 1996.
3. *significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at 1% level. (two-tailed test)
4. For the definitions of the indices, see Appendix.
Source: Author's calculations.
1981ʵ1986 1986ʵ1991 1991ʵ1996Table 2: Differences among Auto Parts Manufacturing Plants (Average in Period):  Group A Keiretsu vs. Other Keiretsu
No. of plants 121 120 134 134 159 144 178 160
Output per worker 2527.44 2314.97 3433.20 2976.28 4956.56 4250.43 * 5111.07 4592.78
Value-added per worker 560.87 594.82 681.35 566.62 1363.76 1082.87 ** 1404.46 1213.95
Average inventory ratio 0.04 0.05 *** 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.04 ** 0.04 0.04
Average monthly wage 32.16 31.71 35.61 34.26 39.72 39.45 46.10 41.95 ***
Capital-labor ratio 762.18 606.63 920.19 860.17 1308.79 1090.00 ** 1515.71 1432.19
Outsourcing ratio 0.69 0.67 0.71 0.70 0.72 0.73 0.70 0.71
Price-cost margin 0.09 0.13 * 0.10 0.06 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.18
Output-cost ratio 1.04 1.09 1.06 1.03 1.19 1.17 1.19 1.18
Capital utilization ratio (%) 89.10 88.44 84.36 84.75 81.36 81.82 77.15 74.92
TFP level (in logarithm) -0.09 -0.05 -0.05 -0.09 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.08
TFP growth rate - - 0.03 -0.05 *** 0.15 0.17 0.04 0.01
TFP growth rateʢ1981ʵ96) - - - - - - 0.22 0.14 **
Notes: 1. All figures are the simple mean of the values of all the samples in each period.
2. *significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at 1% level. (two-tailed test)























KeiretsuTable 3: Differences among Auto Parts Manufacturing Plants (Average in Period):  Independent Suppliers vs. Keiretsu Suppliers
Indep. Keiretsu t-test Indep. Keiretsu t-test Indep. Keiretsu t-test Indep. Keiretsu t-test
No. of plants 40 241 45 268 50 303 57 338
Output per worker 2953.08 2421.65 3426.39 3204.74 6807.49 4620.97 ** 5990.53 4865.73
Value-added per worker 832.01 577.77 ** 857.76 623.99 ** 2508.37 1230.27 *** 2021.08 1314.28 **
Average inventory ratio 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 ** 0.05 0.04
Average monthly wage 32.26 31.94 35.02 34.94 39.61 39.59 43.59 44.13
Capital-labor ratio 707.53 684.73 731.93 890.18 946.44 1204.81 ** 1383.52 1476.18
Outsourcing ratio 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.68 0.71
Price-cost margin 0.15 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.24 0.19 * 0.25 0.19
Output-cost ratio 1.12 1.06 1.12 1.04 ** 1.27 1.18 ** 1.26 1.18 *
Capital utilization ratio (%) 88.21 88.77 84.80 84.56 82.77 81.58 73.90 76.09
TFP level (in logarithm) -0.03 -0.07 -0.01 -0.07 * 0.16 0.07 ** 0.17 0.10 *
TFP growth rate - - 0.02 -0.01 0.14 0.16 0.02 0.02
TFP growth rateʢ1981ʵ96) - - - - - - 0.19 0.18
Notes: 1. All figures are the simple mean of the values of all the samples in each period.
2. *significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at 1% level. (two-tailed test)
3. For the definitions of the indices, see Appendix.
Source: Author's calculations.
1996 1981 1986 1991Table 4: Determinants of TFP Growth Rate for the Japanese Auto Parts Manufacturing Plants  (OLS Estimation)
ʢ1ʣʢ 2ʣʢ 3ʣʢ 4ʣʢ 5ʣʢ 6ʣ
lnTFP(-1) -0.787 -0.866 -0.865 -0.832 -0.910 -0.881
(-8.72) *** (-6.80) *** (-6.79) *** (-6.84) *** (-7.19) *** (-6.84) ***
lnY(-1) -0.032 -0.031 -0.034 -0.028 -0.057 -0.043
(-1.94) * (-1.76) * (-1.92) * (-1.68) * (-3.62) *** (-2.62) ***
NONAUTO 0.216 0.224 0.216 0.257 0.229
(2.71) *** (2.70) *** (2.58) ** (2.73) *** (2.45) **
HI -0.018 -0.054 -0.075 -0.025 -0.069
(-0.35) (-0.80) (-1.08) (-0.15) (-0.40)
RDINT1 24.722 24.602 31.950







lnDIST -0.015 -0.014 -0.035 -0.033
(-1.02) (-0.87) (-2.09) ** (-1.98) **
DENGINE 0.073 0.062 0.068 0.081 0.062 0.076
(1.37) (1.03) (1.12) (1.36) (1.10) (1.35)
DACCEL 0.032 0.041 0.050 0.045 0.026 0.022
(0.86) (0.97) (1.15) (1.06) (0.62) (0.52)
DBRAKE 0.025 0.015 0.024 0.024 0.052 0.044
(0.54) (0.31) (0.47) (0.48) (0.97) (0.81)
DBODY 0.055 0.074 0.072 0.079 0.060 0.054
(1.22) (1.47) (1.43) (1.54) (1.27) (1.12)
DMAKER -0.098 -0.107 0.003 -0.026 0.036
(-0.69) (-0.71) (0.02) (-0.20) (0.28)
S 1*KRETS 1 0.008 0.020
(0.06) (0.15)
S 2*KRETS 2 -0.054 -0.021
(-0.40) (-0.16)
S 3*KRETS 3 -0.017 0.022
(-0.11) (0.14)
S 4*KRETS 4 0.101 0.114
(0.76) (0.85)
S 5*KRETS 5 -0.218 -0.189
(-1.32) (-1.12)
S 6*KRETS 6 -0.059 -0.023
(-0.41) (-0.16)
S 7*KRETS 7 -0.428 -0.412
(-1.82) * (-1.61)
S 8*KRETS 8 -0.175 -0.144
(-1.13) (-0.95)




const. 0.522 0.463 0.572 0.282 0.948 0.793
(2.31) ** (1.89) * (2.40) ** (1.14) (4.06) *** (3.31) ***
No. of obs. 281 210 210 210 210 210
F-value 13.62 *** 8.87 *** 7.25 *** 7.89 *** 5.57 *** 4.83 ***
Adj. R-squared 0.306 0.264 0.269 0.257 0.371 0.336
Root MSE 0.254 0.262 0.262 0.264 0.249 0.255
Notes: 1. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics based on White's robust standard errors.
2. *significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at 1% level. (two-tailed test
Dependent variable: TFP growth rate from 1981 to 1996άϧʔϓB
Sources: Toyo Keizai Shimpo-sha, Kaisha Shiki Ho (various issues) [Japan Company
Handbooks].
Nikkei QUICK Information, Nikkei Kigyo Data: Nikkei NEEDS-MT [Nikkei
Company Data].
Auto Trade Journal (1997).
Figure 4: Japanese Automakers' R&D Intensity and the Average Distance to Primary Keiretsu
Suppliers

































































No. of est. (%)
No. of
workers
(%) No. of est. No. of workers
1981 39 (83.0%) 178,553 (95.5%) 47 186,902
1982 39 (79.6%) 181,129 (94.4%) 49 191,793
1983 39 (83.0%) 181,547 (94.8%) 47 191,480
1984 39 (73.6%) 184,204 (94.8%) 53 194,343
1985 39 (83.0%) 193,054 (96.0%) 47 201,084
1986 39 (78.0%) 184,304 (95.6%) 50 192,750
1987 40 (80.0%) 179,121 (94.4%) 50 189,747
1988 39 (83.0%) 178,358 (94.7%) 47 188,311
1989 39 (86.7%) 180,810 (94.9%) 45 190,546
1990 39 (83.0%) 183,236 (97.0%) 47 188,861
1991 42 (85.7%) 188,856 (96.8%) 49 195,046
1992 42 (89.4%) 185,916 (96.1%) 47 193,504
1993 43 (89.6%) 185,863 (96.0%) 48 193,633
1994 43 (87.8%) 182,850 (99.2%) 49 184,390
1995 44 (88.0%) 177,877 (97.0%) 50 183,298
1996 44 (89.8%) 176,625 (97.4%) 49 181,396
3112ɿAuto body manufacturing
No. of est. (%)
No. of
workers
(%) No. of est. No. of workers
1981 79 (51.3%) 38,593 (78.4%) 154 49,240
1982 79 (55.6%) 38,704 (83.1%) 142 46,586
1983 81 (57.9%) 39,208 (79.2%) 140 49,536
1984 83 (63.8%) 40,436 (82.1%) 130 49,223
1985 83 (52.5%) 42,000 (78.4%) 158 53,549
1986 85 (50.6%) 43,381 (79.7%) 168 54,407
1987 87 (55.4%) 43,186 (86.0%) 157 50,222
1988 88 (56.4%) 43,753 (85.5%) 156 51,152
1989 88 (53.3%) 45,836 (84.9%) 165 53,990
1990 92 (57.1%) 46,994 (85.3%) 161 55,106
1991 94 (55.0%) 50,629 (83.5%) 171 60,668
1992 98 (59.0%) 51,232 (85.3%) 166 60,027
1993 100 (60.6%) 46,917 (83.2%) 165 56,400
1994 106 (61.3%) 48,367 (85.9%) 173 56,290
1995 108 (63.9%) 47,028 (87.2%) 169 53,957
1996 108 (62.1%) 45,836 (86.9%) 174 52,727
3113ɿAuto parts manufacturing
No. of est. (%)
No. of
workers
(%) No. of est. No. of workers
1981 963 (47.1%) 243,696 (63.9%) 2044 381,608
1982 963 (48.0%) 244,028 (65.4%) 2005 373,226
1983 994 (49.2%) 248,575 (67.1%) 2021 370,704
1984 1017 (47.8%) 258,030 (65.8%) 2129 391,964
1985 1043 (45.2%) 269,637 (63.9%) 2305 421,727
1986 1062 (45.0%) 272,295 (64.9%) 2361 419,835
1987 1074 (46.4%) 273,760 (65.4%) 2317 418,410
1988 1082 (46.0%) 280,152 (67.4%) 2353 415,682
1989 1091 (45.4%) 290,409 (67.5%) 2402 429,979
1990 1122 (45.5%) 303,288 (66.9%) 2467 453,384
1991 1164 (45.4%) 311,794 (64.8%) 2564 480,961
1992 1224 (47.8%) 320,176 (68.4%) 2560 468,381
1993 1267 (51.0%) 320,476 (69.6%) 2486 460,646
1994 1299 (52.4%) 319,434 (68.9%) 2480 463,499
1995 1344 (54.9%) 315,352 (70.5%) 2448 447,294
1996 1377 (56.6%) 315,091 (69.3%) 2435 454,408
Source: Compilations from plant-level data underlying METI'sCensus of Manufactures.
Establishments used in our analysis
All establishments with 30 or
more workers
All establishments with 30 or
more workers
All establishments with 30 or
more workers
Appendix Table 1:
Number of Establishments and Number of Workers Used in Our Analysis
Establishments used in our analysis
Establishments used in our analysis